

REVOLUTION IN UKRAINE: US-RUSSIA OPPOSITION

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Abstract

Article was devoted to the theme of "Revolution in Ukraine: US-Russia opposition". It is clear that, after removal from the government of Viktor Yanukovich activity increased in the special status regions in Ukraine. Thirteen regions, which want an independent attitude from Ukraine and one autonomous republic (Autonomous Republic of Crimea) "I set my own fate" performances both in Europe and into the arguments brought to the White House. As a result, the situation was tense in Crimea, which is the most strategic location on the Black sea. Russia entered the Crimea with the pretext of protecting its citizens in Crimea.

What Crimea means for Russia? This question was answered and Russian position in this article.

The United States position was also widely commented in the article. It should be noted that, in recent years, the US stay away from the Eurasian. However, increasingly engages in a more active policy in Ukraine crisis. It is considered to be a number of reasons. First, the United States the European security and disrupt the current balance of the Ukrainian crisis is worried that endanger. On the other hand, the effect of strained bilateral relations with Russia are seen as important.

However, everyone understands that this is a conflict between Moscow and Washington and that these countries should negotiate a solution. The question here is not Crimea but which reality the two sides are prepared to accept.

It should be noted that, Ukraine crisis, the US, the EU and Russia the three great powers "In Eastern Europe big game" is features. Which is similar to the history of decades of struggles for national, regional and global political, social, economic and military consequences have emerged.

Unfortunately, the system of international relations in the modern world where it is converted into unpleasant political brand.

In conclusion it should be noted that, the processes discussed in Ukraine on the international scene and create a serious opposition between the United States and Russia.

Keywords: Ukraine, Crimea crisis, US, Russia, opposition

1. INTRODUCTION

Protest originally erupted in November 2013 after President Viktor Yanukovich chose not to sign a political association and free trade agreement with the European union at the summit of the Eastern Partnership at Vilnius, choosing closer ties with Russia instead. Russia also offered Ukraine cheaper gas prices. In addition to the money, the EU required major changes to the regulations and laws in Ukraine. Russia, however, did not. Russia also applied economic pressures on Ukraine and launched a propaganda campaign against the EU-Ukraine deal Yanukovich is widely disliked in Ukraine's west, but had some support in his native Russian-speaking east, as well as the south. The rallies were initially peaceful but eventually became violent in January 2014 after parliament, dominated by Yanukovich's supporters, passed laws intended to repress the protest. Russia, hoping to build an alliance of ex-Soviet states, has made extensive efforts to derail Ukraine's pact with the European Union with a mixture of trade sanctions and promises. The European Union and the United States urged Yanukovich to negotiate a peaceful end to the conflict and said they would introduce sanctions against those responsible for the violence. (Vladimir Isachenkov and Maria Danilova. 20 February 2014). In the lead up to the February riots, an amnesty agreement was made with protesters wherein they would be granted release from charges in exchange for active protesters leaving occupied buildings. Protesters vacated all occupied Regional State Administration buildings, and activists in Kiev left the Hrushevskoho Street standoff; Kiev City Hall was also released back to government control on 16 February.

2. THE CAUSES OF CRISIS IN UKRAINE AND THE PROMINENT FEATURES.

The crisis in Ukraine, stems from the from a complex interaction between internal and external interests. At this point, tensions to mention a few points and will be useful to understand the conflict lines. First, it should be noted that, the Ukrainian government has made many mistakes that increase the influence of the dissent.

There are many signs that the current Euromaidan movement actually began well before. Opposition and Western allies, in order to ensure the ruling power in the hands of the opposition, the likely 2015 presidential elections had to prepare for mass actions. Therefore, the development of the Ukrainian crisis has become so complex and greatly slow character.

In the case of Ukraine, must take into account the position of the largest financial and industrial group since the signing of the EU Association Agreement. The interests of large companies; status and the legalization of property, determines that the request to become part of the international capital and access to credit by European banks. (Sergey Tolstov. 1 subat 2014. <http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/gorus/ukraynadaki-siyasi-krizin-sebepleri-ve-one-cikan-ozellikleri>).

The crisis in Kiev, it should be noted that is connected with three factors: 1) fragility of political system in the country, 2) fragility of the economic oligarchs feeding structure, and 3) also socio-political requirements of the people. In this context, disintegration of the identity of the country (pro-Russia and pro-Western) ended, but it can rather be claimed that political and economical and political the earth occur. Because, as a rule, in the former Soviet Union, in particular it not really will help to understand a political range and developments of management hold in area Western or subjects of categorical distinction between pro-Russian Ukraine told. They pursued balance policy between the governments in the West and in Russia, and in general behave pragmatic, it can also be expressed to the interconnected property in the region.

The increasing political and economic pressure Yanukovich administration from February 2010 until February 2014 is led to the consolidation of the political opposition with the majority of people. Putin's regime is dominant because of the agreement with Russia, which meant the continuation of the corrupt political and economic order in the country. Because these improvements were more favorable to Moscow. Here comes with this landmark protests led to a change in power. Russia's invasion of the Crimea in the subsequent change of government, has transformed the domestic political crisis, regional and global crisis.

3. US-RUSSIA OPPOSITION OVER UKRAINE.

3.1. What Crimea means for Russia?

Crimea looms large in Russian history. It was the site of the Crimean War fought in the 1850's against the French, British and Ottoman Empire. Although Russia lost, the bravery of its soldiers is still a source of Russian pride, much like The Alamo in Texas. Its resort city of Yalta hosted the famous talks between Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill.

Yet Russia's interests in Crimea go far beyond nostalgia. As important as the region is for Russian pride, as the map below shows it looms even larger in the geopolitics of the region. The naval base at Sevastopol, on Crimea's southwestern tip, is Russia's only warm water naval base and its primary means of extending force through the Mediterranean. It has been alleged that the port city has been used extensively to supply Bashar al-Assad throughout the current civil war in Syria.

Putin will also see a military build up in his backyard. NATO membership for Georgia, with the advanced weapon systems and training it will bring, will surely degrade Russian national security. The port of Batumi, could also serve as an important military asset.

Perhaps most importantly, annexation of Crimea will mean that Putin has lost Ukraine for good. It will be a transgression that will not be forgotten or forgiven and will speed up European aid and integration.

The Crimean Tatars, with their deep hatred of Russia, will resist Russian sovereignty, possibly resulting in a situation similar to the one in war-torn Chechnya. The Russian President is, in effect, sowing the seeds of conflict for decades to come. (<http://www.forbes.com/sites/gregsatell/2014/03/01/5-things-you-should-know-about-putins-incursion-into-crimea/>).

What Putin neglected to mention is that Crimea is rich in natural resources like oil and gas. Russia is looking for new ways to supplant its dwindling Siberian energy reserves. If Russia claims Crimea, then any energy resources found there will be under Russian rule, a tantalizing option for Putin to have in his pocket.

Of course, the big interests of Russia's rulers in Ukraine, their personal economic interests, weigh heavily. But even more important is the belief that, in the countries of the former Soviet Union, it is Moscow that must define the rules of the game. Ukraine, like Poland in 1981, Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Hungary in 1956, rose up against this principle of limited sovereignty. And the Russians want to bring Ukraine to heel, just as they did with its western neighbors.

In fact, Russia's afraid of the example rebelling Ukrainians have set for Russians, specifically of the danger that the development of rule of law and other Western attributes in Ukraine would erode the foundations of his governance at home. He wants Ukraine to continue serving as a bulwark against Westernizing reform so that Russia's hugely corrupt system of crony capitalism "the merging of business and politics for the good of the ruling elite" will survive. (Gregory Feifer. March 9, 2014. Why Russia really wants Crimea).

3.2. Priorities for US policy toward Ukraine.

It should be noted that, in recent years, the US stay away from the Eurasian. However, increasingly engages in a more active policy in Ukraine crisis. It is considered to be a number of reasons. First, the United States the European security and disrupt the current balance of the Ukrainian crisis is worried that endanger. On the other hand, the effect of strained bilateral relations with Russia are seen as important.

Why should Americans care about Ukraine? First, Ukraine has been a good international partner of the United States for more than two decades. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, Ukraine had on its territory the world's third largest nuclear arsenal-including some 1900 strategic nuclear warheads arming 176 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and 45 strategic bombers-all designed to strike the United States. Ukraine agreed to give up that arsenal, transferring the nuclear warheads to Russia for elimination and destroying the ICBMs and bombers. (Steven Pifer. 5 May. Opinion: Ukraine Faced Outcast Status With Its Nukes).

In 1998, Ukraine was participating in the construction of the nuclear power plant at Bushehr in Iran. At U.S. behest, the Ukrainian government aligned its non-proliferation policy with U.S. policy and withdrew from the project, forcing Russia to find another and more expensive provider of turbine generators for the Iranian reactor.

In 2003, following the downfall of Saddam Hussein, Kyiv responded positively to the U.S. request for contributions to the coalition force in Iraq. At one point, the Ukrainian army had nearly 2000 troops, the fourth largest military contingent, in country.

Second, as part of the agreement by which Ukraine gave up its nuclear weapons, the United States, Britain and Russia committed in the 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine and not to use or threaten to use force against Ukraine. Russia's illegal seizure and annexation of Crimea constitute a gross violation of its commitments under that document, as does Russia's ongoing support for separatists in eastern Ukraine. The United States and Britain should meet their commitments by supporting Ukraine and pressuring Russia to halt actions that violate the memorandum. (Budapest Memorandums on security Assurances, 1994. December 5, 1994)

Third, Russia's actions constitute a fundamental challenge to the post-war order in Europe. The illegal seizure of Crimea is the most blatant land-grab that Europe has seen since 1945. The United States and Europe need to respond adequately and ensure that Russia faces consequences for this kind of behavior. Otherwise, the danger is that Mr. Putin may pursue other actions that would further threaten European security and stability.

4. US REACTION TO THE RUSSIAN ANNEXATION OF CRIMEA

The United States has strongly condemned the Russian military invasion of Crimea and Russia's ongoing efforts to destabilize eastern Ukraine. On March 3, President Obama said "the world is largely united in recognizing that the steps Russia has taken are a violation of Ukraine's sovereignty, Ukraine's territorial integrity; that they're a violation of international law ... " President Obama acknowledged Russian ties to Ukraine, adding that "all of those interests I think can be recognized. But what cannot be done is for Russia, with impunity, to put its soldiers on the ground and violate basic principles that are recognized around the world." (<http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/03/03/remarks-presidentobama-and-prime-minister-netanyahu-bilateral-meeting>.)

In the wake of Russia's annexation of Crimea, U.S. President Obama in mid-March issued three executive orders sanctioning Russia, which were supplemented by the blocking of several Russian and Ukrainian officials and one Russian bank by the U.S. Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). The U.S. Departments of Commerce and State subsequently moved to increase pressure on the Russian economy by restricting exports. Whether Russian or U.S. companies feel the brunt of these new measures has yet to be determined.

On 25 March 2014, the U.S. Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) placed a hold on the issuance of licenses that would authorize the export or re-export of items to Russia. BIS regulates the export and re-export of "dual use" items subject to U.S. jurisdiction that are intended for civilian use but could be used or modified for a military application. In its announcement, BIS stated that this ban had been in place since 1 March 2014 and would remain in effect until further notice.

The U.S. Department of State's Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) followed the BIS lead and issued a similar statement on its website on 26 March. DDTC is responsible for regulating the export and re-export of defense articles and defense services from the U.S.

Administration officials condemned the May 11 "referendums" held by the separatists in eastern Ukraine as illegal and invalid. President Obama and Administration officials warned that the United States will impose additional sanctions on Russia if it disrupts Ukraine's May 25 presidential election. On May 25, President Obama congratulated the people of Ukraine on holding the presidential election despite threats from Russian-backed separatists, and on May 26, Obama congratulated Poroshenko on his victory. President Obama met with President-elect Poroshenko in Warsaw on June 4. The two leaders discussed Poroshenko's plans for reforms, including in economic reform, improving the investment climate, fighting corruption, and reducing energy dependence on Russia. They also discussed a package of additional U.S. assistance to Ukraine to support reforms in these areas, as well as training and equipment for Ukraine's law enforcement bodies and armed forces to help them deal with the crisis in eastern Ukraine. Vice President Biden attended President Poroshenko's inauguration on June 7. On June 23, in a telephone conversation with President Putin, President Obama called upon Putin to "press the separatists to recognize and abide by the ceasefire and to halt the flow of weapons and materiel across its border into Ukraine. The President emphasized that words must be accompanied by actions and that the United States remains prepared to impose additional sanctions should circumstances warrant, in coordination with our allies and partners." (<http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/06/23/readout-president-s-call-president-putin-russia>.) The Administration has been reluctant to impose unilateral U.S. sanctions against Russia, noting that it continues to work with EU and other countries on the issue. Press reports claim that U.S. business groups with interests in Russia have lobbied heavily against unilateral sanctions, warning that European competitors could take advantage of them to squeeze out U.S. firms. In August 2014, President Barack Obama stated: "We had a very productive relationship with President Medvedev. ... I think President Putin represents a deep strain in Russia that is probably harmful to Russia over the long term..." Obama also verbally attacked Russia, saying: "Russia doesn't make anything. Immigrants aren't rushing to Moscow in search of opportunity. The life expectancy of the Russian male is around 60 years old. The population is shrinking." On August 7, Russia granted NSA leaker Edward Snowden 3 more years of asylum, presumably in retaliation to America's intervention in Ukraine. Due to the situation concerning Ukraine, relations between the United States and Russia are at their worst since the end of the Cold war. (<http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/08/03/us-ukraine-crisis-obama-idUSKBN0G30Q920140803>).

Although the executive orders issued by Obama lay the groundwork for imposing future economic sanctions on Russia, they do not currently have a tangible impact on the private sector. By contrast, the BIS and DDTC actions took immediate effect and have a direct impact on U.S. businesses that export goods to Russia. The DDTC freeze on license approvals equates to a complete ban on the export of military products and services to Russia, as the exports of any such products, services or related technical data require DDTC approval. The actions by BIS will be felt by U.S. companies on a product-by-product basis. BIS's hold on license approvals only applies to products, software and technologies that are specifically controlled for export and re-export to Russia and require a license. U.S. companies may still export and re-export to Russia products, software and technology that do not require a license from BIS (M. Angella Castille, Paul Finlan, Matthew R. Levy, Irina Mikhnova. 14 April 2014). As a result of Russia's surge in support for separatists in eastern Ukraine in August and September (including the direct involvement of thousands of Russian troops), U.S. officials said that the United States was considering additional sanctions against Russia, in coordination with the EU. The additional sanctions could be announced as early as September 5.

5. RESULT

Negative consequences for Russia in all areas of the Ukraine crisis is likely to breed. Because of Moscow's moves in both local and regional, has upset the global politics of both traditions. Invasion of the Crimea in the local context, the Ukrainians have increased the sense of nationhood and combines them more. With a population of 2 million voters unable to vote in the Crimea, the Ukrainian politics will surely affect and then will move further from the Ukrainian community in Russia. Then the fragility of the crisis in Ukrainian politics will also be trying to resolve with the support of the EU, corrupt political and economic system will begin to be

transformed more quickly. The status of the Russian invasion of Crimean Tatars against the Ukrainians and will continue to be a concern. Tatars and exposed to constant migration of Tatars inhabited by the Soviets of pain now will be appeased by Moscow does not seem very convincing. Already region Cossacks being shipped and will be removed from the Tatar is spoken in some regions.

Russia at the global level, primarily the United States and are likely to be isolated by global actors, including the EU. This will erode the Moscow's global prestige. Russia with a fait accompli that the founder of the UN system to challenge invaded Crimea, Russia and international actors "vicinity" of the maneuver is certainly open new areas

6. CONCLUSION

A behind therein, in the presence of a large number of prospects of relations between the two countries which have experienced frustration last 20-year period, when the Ukrainian crisis resolved, shows the United States would approach them with more moderate and realistic targets in Russia. The Cold War, 1990, and as long as the left behind the legacy of the current crisis, whether initiated by the Kremlin wants the White House, all kinds of reset attempts, already the relationship in a limited and difficult situation can not go a little further than managing more effectively.

Finally, it should be noted that, implements the date of the "cold war" in 1990 began to show signs of , recovery in recent years. Russian security strategy around the need for political and economic securitization is trying to create a field. However, this strategy is the point where serious crises in conflict with international law. Russia this crisis seems to have accelerated the resurrection of the Cold War. On the other hand, the movement of people experienced in Ukraine and the crisis of legitimacy is disputed. Nevertheless, it seems that the 21st century is happening on the streets of revolt movements and quickly became a nightmare communicative government. This situation requires a review of the security strategies again.

7. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

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