

MULTICULTURAL NETHERLANDS: THE TURKISH ASPECT

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Abstract

With the Moroccan one coming in as second, the Turkish diaspora accounts for the highest percentage of the Muslim minority in the Netherlands. It is already the third generation of Turkish origin living there. Although tightly connected with their own culture, next to Moroccans Turks show a significantly greater ability to integrate with the Western culture than other Muslim minority groups living in the Netherlands, as the last research indicates. Paradoxically though, it is this well-integrating ethnic minority, and particularly its younger generation, that talks about going back to the country of origin of their ancestors. Thus, they manifest their disagreement to the government's policy towards them which according to them is discriminatory, primarily in terms of the labour market.

The possibility of losing the most valuable, well-educated young representatives of the biggest ethnic diaspora in the Netherlands constitutes one of the aspects of the so-called "return migration" or "remigration". In this respect, the re-orientation of the government's policy towards minorities seems to be necessary.

The aim of the presentation is to analyse and try to evaluate the current situation.

Keywords: multiculturalism, Turkish diaspora, integration, immigration policy.

1. INTRODUCTION

Multiculturalism is associated with an informed co-existence in the same space of two or more social groups with culturally different distinctive features (Golka, 2007, p. 39). They include among others physical appearance, language, religion or system of values. Multiculturalism can be analyzed at the local and general public level when "people realize that some of their neighbours have different values, follow different standards and implement different cultural practices in everyday life while considering this to be a normal state of affairs" (Mucha, 2005, p. 52).

With the continuous progress of globalization, the phenomenon of multiculturalism refers nowadays almost to every part of the world. Effects of globalization are varied including among others deterritorialization of cultures marked by the creation of a new diasporism, hyperspaces, hyperreality and the so-called ethnoscapas (Burszta, 1998, p. 159). The boundaries of nation-states, i.e. the countries of immigrants' origin, are "transferred" by them in their mind and awareness to their host countries. Thus, rather than creating typical diasporas in a new context, ethnic groups establish a nation outside of a homeland (Kearney, 1995, p. 553). According to James Clifford, "people and things are increasingly out of place" (Clifford, 2000, p. 12). Pluralistic societies of Europe look less and less like model nation-states (Habermas, 2009, pp. 111-130), socially homogeneous. There is a growing diversity of cultural forms of life, ethnic groups and religious beliefs. One of the key problems of European countries today is what they will look like in the future. Their internal cohesion is changing although up until recently it was still solidified by their uniform identity, history, axiology or culture (Habermas, op. cit.).

Various entities will be functioning within this *global village*, to use McLuhan's term, who will include, although to a varied degree of activity, partners in interaction, i.e. representatives of different cultures, regardless of their age, sex or education. The so-called "intermediaries", personified by politicians, journalists or teachers, constitute an important element of this multicultural jigsaw puzzle. Due to their enormous social impact, it is primarily their responsibility to provide for the correct, free of subjective opinions, interpretation of messages coming from ethnically diversified environments. The proper evaluation of cultural differences is namely possible only when rather than applying our own standards to other individuals, groups or societies, we analyze differences, their root causes and possible consequences arising from cultural or religious preconditions. This awareness should be built up based on the wisdom of the both host societies and those

who want to be or who have already been accepted by them.

The ongoing discussions held in Europe with respect to immigrants (particularly those of Muslim origin) focus mainly on issues related to the formation of ethnic ghettos, lack of immigrants' assimilation within the culture and language of their adopted country and problems connected with the labour market. All these issues make it difficult for newcomers to experience a social advancement and make them dependent on the social welfare system, while also generating criminal activity and increasing their susceptibility to political extremism (Grzymała, Kozłowska, 2008, pp. 11-12). Immigrants are often perceived by Europeans as a force destabilizing the labour market, a safety threat and, in extreme cases, also a threat to national identity and culture. The situation is exacerbated by the fact that "immigration or immigrants often constitute an axis of political campaigns and debates with old prejudices, historically rooted tensions, stereotypes or simply myths played all over again" (Iglicka, 2004, p. 2). It is worth quoting here the words of renowned anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss who pointed out that "one culture has no absolute criteria for judging the activities of another culture as 'low' or 'noble'" (Levi-Strauss, Eribon, 1988, p. 229). There is no scientific justification allowing to recognize the superiority or inferiority of one culture over another.

For centuries Europe was the determinant of values, role models and criteria, a reference point for the evaluation of any other way of life. It served as a kind of "supreme court" whose authoritative opinion could not be appealed (Bauman, 2005, pp. 12-13). Being a special type of community, it has developed ideals and values which have emerged throughout history, constituting an integral part of both its history and present. The contemporary European culture is based on the pillars of Greek philosophy, Roman law tradition, Christianity and legacy of Enlightenment. The quintessence of its existence is represented by rationality, justice, democracy and freedom (Bauman, op. cit., p. 189). All these elements should be a prerequisite for taking action aimed at making all the citizens living in this part of the world feel safe, regardless of their skin colour or background.

Although one of the priorities of the Immigrant Integration Policy in the European Union is to combat racism and racial discrimination¹, the EU member states are still not free from their manifestations. The evidence of acts of discrimination and xenophobia may be found among others in the report prepared by the European Network Against Racism (ENAR) for the years of 2012/2013. The report shows that vulnerable groups most easily subject to exclusion, particularly in the labour market, include Roma, Muslims, immigrants from Africa, black citizens of Europe and women of migrant background². The economic crisis has further worsened their situation exacerbating inequalities between ethnic minorities and the rest of society, particularly in the area of employment³.

Similarly to other EU member states, the Dutch immigration policy is not flawless. While experiencing some social and political turmoil, the culturally diversified society of the Netherlands nowadays fights for the rights of both indigenous inhabitants of the country and newcomers coming here in large numbers from all over the world. Problems with the integration of minorities result from anti-immigrant attitudes which are to be counterbalanced with, often misinterpreted, political correctness, which in turn implies misunderstandings among the Dutch themselves. Today, a certain *modus vivendi* seems to be expected by all the citizens of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, both the indigenous (autochthonous) and allochthonous ones.

Next to Moroccans, Turks constitute the largest Muslim diaspora in the Netherlands. Over decades they have developed their current position, becoming citizens of this part of Europe, with full citizen rights. Compared to other non-Western immigrants living in the Netherlands, until recently Turks still presented a high degree of integration with the Dutch society. Unfortunately, over the recent years a disturbing trend has emerged, particularly among the well-educated young generation of Turkish immigrants. Feeling discriminated against, among others in the labour market, they try to fight for their rights. Some of them, however, leave the Netherlands opting for the return to their country of origin⁴.

The aim of this article is to raise a significant issue which is the problem of integration of the Turkish minority in the Dutch society, and to stress the need for real actions in order to change the vector of the current Dutch immigration policy which in the context of European integration practices towards minorities is

¹ http://ec.europa.eu/ewsi/en/EU_actions_integration.cfm [23.09.2014].

² <http://www.enar-eu.org/ENAR-Shadow-Report-on-racism> [23.09.2014].

³ In Finland and Belgium the unemployment rate among people born outside the European Union is three times higher compared to the indigenous people of these countries. In Spain immigrants from Africa are twice as likely to be unemployed than the rest of society. In the UK people with foreign names are discriminated against in the labour market, while in the Netherlands more than half of recruitment agencies use "dirty" practices towards candidates of Moroccan, Turkish and Surinamese origin. More in: <http://www.enar-eu.org/Shadow-Reports-on-racism-in-Europe-203> [12.10.2014].

⁴ <http://www.republiekallochtonie.nl> [22.11.2014] and <http://www.nmigratie.nl/nmi.php?mnu=12> [22.11.2014].

considered to be one of the most restrictive (Lavanex, 2006 , pp. 329-50).

2. IMMIGRATION OUTLINE OF THE NETHERLANDS – ISLAMIC CONTEXT

Five centuries have passed since the first settlers came to the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The first major wave of foreigners appeared as early as in the 17th century, when large numbers of French Huguenots emigrated to the Kingdom after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685 by King of France Louis XIV (Walaszek, 2007, pp. 67-68).

In the 19th century, during the Spring of Nations, the Netherlands saw mass immigration waves from Germany, Belgium, Great Britain, and even Russia and Poland. The 1849 Aliens Act allowed the newcomers to work and settle in the country, incidentally becoming the first Dutch immigration act⁵. The Netherlands faced problems associated with the integration of foreigners already then. Not all new citizens were willing to adjust themselves to cultural requirements of the country. Particularly, the Germans from the Westerwald created the biggest problems, as they found it especially difficult to adapt⁶.

Until World War II, the Netherlands was the destination for temporary emigration⁷. It was not until after 1945 that the country became the place of choice for permanent settling purposes for immigrants, often those from outside of the European cultural environment. With time they were accompanied by their family members (Matusz - Protasiewicz, 2008, pp. 24-30). Currently, the number of immigrants in the Netherlands is estimated at 3 584 000, including 950 000 immigrants of Muslim origin, which accounts for over 5% of the total population⁸, with Turks and Moroccans representing the biggest groups (Table 2).

Table 1. Major diasporas of non-Western immigrants in the Netherlands (2012-2014).

Country of origin	Year		
	2008	2012	2014
Turkey	372 714	392 923	396 414
Morocco	335 127	362 954	374 996
Surinam	335 799	346 797	348 291
The Antilles	131 841	143 992	146 855
Non-Western immigrants (total)	1 765 730	1 937 651	1 997 584

Source:

<http://statline.cbs.nl/StatWeb/publication/?VW=T&DM=SLNL&PA=37325&D1=0&D2=a&D3=0&D4=0&D5=2-4,11,38,46,95-96,137,152,178,182,199,220,237&D6=0,4,8,12,16,I&HD=140523-1106&HDR=T,G2,G3,G5&STB=G1,G4> [18.10.2014].

In the recent decades, the Netherlands has become home to many ethnic, national and religious groups. In 2000-2009, the total population of the Netherlands increased by about 622 000 people, thus almost reaching the number of 16.5 million people. Today, it amounts to 16.9 million people (data from October, 2014)⁹. Of all immigrants living in the Netherlands, the Western ones account for 1.6 million people, while the non-Western ones represent 1.9 million¹⁰. In 2011, the immigration reached its record number of 163 000 of new members of the multicultural Dutch community, mostly represented by immigrants from the EU member states. It is estimated that by 2040, the country population will rise to 17.8 million people, which is approximately 1.1 million citizens more compared to 2012¹¹. The Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute predicts that by 2050, 7.6% of the Dutch population will be Muslim, which in numbers is represented

⁵ <http://www.vijfeeuwenmigratie.nl/term/Vreemdelingenbeleid#716-def> [12.08.2014]

⁶ <http://www.mareonline.nl/2003/13/03> [15.08.2014].

⁷ <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/> [29.10.2014].

⁸ <http://statline.cbs.nl/StatWeb/publication/?VW=T&DM=SLNL&PA=37325&D1=0&D2=a&D3=0&D4=0&D5=2-4,11,38,46,95-96,137,152,178,182,199,220,237&D6=0,4,8,12,16,I&HD=140523-1106&HDR=T,G2,G3,G5&STB=G1,G4> [23.11.2014].

⁹ <http://www.cbs.nl/en-GB/menu/cijfers/default.htm> [5.12.2014].

¹⁰ <http://statline.cbs.nl/StatWeb/publication> [12.11.2014].

¹¹ <http://www.cbs.nl/en-GB/menu/themas/bevolking/publicaties/artikelen/archief/2014/2014-069-pb.htm> [18.08.2014].

by the equivalent of 1.3 million Islamic-oriented people¹², with over 455 000 of them being Turkish¹³.

2.1. TURKISH IMMIGRATION IN THE NETHERLANDS – IN RETROSPECT

In fact, the Turkish diaspora living in the Netherlands is the community not only of strictly Turkish (originally nomadic Mongolian people) origin, but it also includes Kurds, Arabs, Syrians, Armenians, Turkmens, Karakalpaks, Tatars, Bosnians, Greeks, Jews and Albanians. This indicates a great cultural and religious diversity of the very diaspora that came from Turkey (Matusz - Protasiewicz, 2008, pp. 24-31). Of all the European countries, the Netherlands is considered to have the highest number of citizens of Turkish origin (Milewski, Hamel, 2010, pp. 615-658).

Although the history of Turkish-Dutch relations spans the period of nearly 400 years¹⁴, it is actually in the 1960s that the cultural rapprochement of the two nations was initiated. In 1960, the Central Bureau of Statistics reported the presence of Turkish citizens in the Netherlands for the first time (Peninx, 2005, 33-48). The significant economic growth in Western Europe during that period resulted in a high demand for labour force. Foreign workers who could contribute to the economic development of this part of the world were actively recruited. The Dutch policy of obtaining “manpower” focused primarily on the Mediterranean area, where residents were recruited mainly from Spain, Italy, Morocco and Turkey. The first bilateral agreements were concluded with Italy (1960), Spain (1961), Portugal (1963) and Turkey (1964), followed by those made with Greece (1966), Yugoslavia (1970) and Tunisia (1971) (Matusz - Protasiewicz, 2008, op. cit.).

Under the bilateral provisions, Turks provided reinforcements for the Dutch labour market up until 1974. The next step of Turkish immigration revolved mainly around the process of starting a family and family reunification¹⁵. Incidentally, family migration is still a regular element of settling process among the Turkish diaspora in the UK (Kulu-Glasgow, Leerkes, 2013, pp. 369-382).

Most Turkish immigrants who came to the Netherlands in the 1960s and 1970s constituted low-skilled labour force. Typically, they engaged in providing services in shipbuilding, agriculture, textile industry and construction. Consequently, they mainly populated large cities, such as Rotterdam, Amsterdam, Utrecht and The Hague, and cities and towns in the south-west of Brabant. In terms of social and economic aspects, this largest non-Western ethnic minority in the Netherlands to this day still prospers best on the outskirts of large cities (Randstad) which offer more employment opportunities, better pay and thus a bigger chance to gain more independence.

The balance of migration over the years in relation to the Turkish diaspora is subject to various demographic fluctuations resulting among others from the difference between the number of people who have come to the Netherlands and those who have left it, for example due to remigration (Euwals, Dagevos, Gijssberts, Roodenburg, 2010, pp. 19-20). The complexity and unpredictability of this process may also be affected by other important factors, such as a new state strategy towards immigration (e.g. the “family reunification” policy in the 1980s), suspension of immigration due to the economic recession, followed by an increased number of representatives of the Turkish diaspora leaving the Netherlands (1980), or an unpredictable influx of refugees and asylum-seekers from all over the world ever since the 1990s (Dourlijn, Dagevos, 2011, pp. 35-41).

Currently, out of 396 000 people within the Turkish community living in the Netherlands, as many as 199 000 belong to the second generation of newcomers (Table 2)¹⁶. The third generation accounts for 197 000 residents. The last two generations present a better level of integration with the Dutch culture than the first generation of Turkish immigrants. They have a good education, better jobs and higher pay. It is therefore a

¹² Muslims in the Netherlands, FORUM Institute for Multicultural Affairs, Utrecht, 2012.

¹³ <http://statline.cbs.nl/StatWeb/publication> [12.11.2014].

¹⁴ The relations between the Netherlands and Turkey have a four-century-long tradition based on diplomatic, trade and cultural cooperation. More in: Geke van der Wal en Mathijs Tax (ed.), *De vele gezichten van Turks Nederland: een wie is wie*, Hilversum 1999, and *Nederland en Turkije, 400 vriendschap en verbondenheid*, Forum Instytut voor multikulturele vraagstukken, 2012.

¹⁵ More than 80% of Turkish and Moroccan men and women choose a marriage partner from the same ethnic background. Around 8 to 9% choose a native Dutch partner, and 7 and 11% of Moroccan and Turkish men respectively marry a partner of a different ethnic origin. In: Muslims in the Netherlands, FORUM Institute for Multicultural Affairs, Utrecht, 2012, p. 11.

¹⁶ <http://statline.cbs.nl/StatWeb/publication/?VW=T&DM=SLNL&PA=81584NED&D1=1,3,8,12-15&D2=0&D3=0&D4=0-2&D5=0,7,17,27,37,I&HD=130128-1450&HDR=G1,G2,T&STB=G3,G4> [26.11.2014].

paradox that over the last years it is them who either leave or declare their wish to leave the Netherlands¹⁷.

2.2. PROBLEMS OF THE YOUNG GENERATION OF TURKISH IMMIGRANTS – REMIGRATION

In the past few years an increased mobility has been observed of representatives of ethnic minorities in the Netherlands remigrating to the countries of their origin. Among those leaving the Netherlands in biggest numbers are Turks, whose young and the well-educated generation has decided to return to their homeland. The departure of the young Dutch generation of Turkish origin is perceived as a loss of young, talented and educated citizens of the country and a result of errors made in the integration policy of the state. The paradox is that the group of young people who opt for remigration are the same young people who seem to have integrated relatively best in the Dutch society (Klaver, Stouten, van der Welle, 2010, p. 10).

The general social debate on the decisions and motives behind these decisions of this part of the Turkish diaspora, so valuable for the Dutch economy, primarily revolves around the issue of stricter and stricter immigration policy of the state, and visible manifestations of discrimination and rejection observed in the Netherlands, particularly with respect to residents of non-Western origin. An unfriendly, as they claim, social and political climate together with the lack of future prospects force this part of the population to leave the country, often the place of their birth (Fermin, 2014, pp. 6-7). It is worth mentioning that the currently available source materials do not provide sufficient evidence yet on the remigration of the young generation of Turks. Their motives and reasons for emigration have not been sufficiently recognized yet. Preliminary findings of the studies need yet to be confirmed in a large-scale survey of a representative group of immigrants. With no detailed studies available, it would be impossible to provide a uniform evaluation of this phenomenon (Fermin, 2014, p. 19-20). However, based on the sources which are available, even if only in the form of a few reports and statistics, one may attempt to look into a significant problem arising in connection with this part of the immigrant community in the Netherlands.

The 2011 forecast of Turkish-Dutch experts on to the future of the young generation of the Turkish diaspora was in fact a warning against the situation that is currently taking place¹⁸. The manifesto was a kind of a harbinger of the events that were highly probable to become reality in the near future. The criticism was already then focused among others on the government policy allowing for an increasing isolation of immigrants, particularly of the younger generation, and on a biased, according to experts, evaluation of the situation by Turkish circles. Additionally, attention was paid to mental problems of a part of the young generation¹⁹, associated with depression and progressive religious radicalization²⁰. Thus, the bond between the Turkish and Dutch community seems to have weakened accordingly²¹.

One gets the impression that more and more Turks feel like second-class citizens who fear that they will never become a part of the Dutch society. A number of alarming signals may be observed with respect to this part of the immigrant community, i.e. education problems²², a high unemployment rate within the diaspora, discrimination, being underpaid when compared to Dutch workers, as well as the lack of representation in politics, administration and the media. In addition, the younger generation does not have leaders to identify with. Klaver points to several more reasons that contribute to their decision to leave which include as follows: the economic position of Turkey corresponding to greater opportunities in the labour market, too individualistic, according to respondents, an approach to the human, as represented by the Dutch community, weaker family ties compared to the Turkish tradition, insecurity and a wish to prove oneself in a new environment (Klaver, Stouten, van der Welle, 2010, pp. 63-74). Invariably, also the argument is raised of the lack of equal opportunities in the Dutch society for non-Western immigrants,

¹⁷ <http://www.republiekallochtonie.nl/integratie-turkse-nederlanders-blijft-hoog-op-de-agenda-staan> [18.11.2014].

¹⁸ Staring, R., Geelhoed, F., Aslanoglu, G., Hiah, J., Kox, M., Maatschappelijke positie van Turkse Nederlanders ontwikkelingen en risico's op criminaliteit en radicalisering, The Hague 2014.

¹⁹ <http://www.volkskrant.nl/buitenland/grote-zorgen-over-turks-nederlandse-jeugd-a1790353/> [22.11.2014].

²⁰ <http://www.republiekallochtonie.nl/turkse-nederlanders-slaan-alarm> [22.11.2014].

²¹ <http://www.republiekallochtonie.nl/turkse-nederlanders-slaan> [18.11.2014].

²² The young generation of Turkish immigrants still lags behind its Dutch peers in this respect, even though the number of educated young Turks is three times higher compared to the first generation of Turkish immigrants. In: <http://www.cbs.nl/nl-NL/menu/unique/search/default.htm?cx=018020871965988641477:rvmzjpho2wq&cof=FORID:11&q=onde-rwijs+immigranten> [23.11.2014].

particularly those with the Muslim background.

In recent years, the emigration balance among the Turkish diaspora (Table 2) has increased in all the groups, except for those aged 55-65. In 2004-2011, two-thirds of immigrants of Turkish origin under 35 years of age left the Netherlands and remigrated to Turkey. Although high, the percentage of young people emigrating from Holland has levelled off over the years.

Table 2. Dutch Turks emigrating from the Netherlands in 2004-2011, by age group (x 1000).

Age group	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Average
0-15	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.4
15-25	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.6	0.3
25-35	0.5	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.6	0.3
35-45	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.2
55-65	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.2
+65	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2
Total	1.9	1.7	1.8	2	2	2.1	2.3	2.9	1.7

Source: Based on Fermin A., *Emigratie van hoogopgeleide Turks-Duitse en Nederlandse jongeren naar Turkije*. Forum Factsheet, November 2014, p.7.

3. INTEGRATION OF THE TURKISH DIASPORA – AN ATTEMPT OF AN OVERVIEW

From the historical point of view, immigration in the Netherlands was perceived as a phenomenon dependent on specific contextual factors, which was to indicate to its temporary character. Initially, the aim of the government was to help immigrants to return to their homeland as soon as possible. Thus, the government policy in that time was directed towards the concept of “preserving the own identity”²³ of the groups of immigrants arriving, as it was believed, only temporarily (van Egeraat, 1995, pp. 15-16). The subsequent years saw a change in the policy towards minorities²⁴, resulting in granting them the voting rights in 1985 (Matusz-Protasiewicz, 2008, pp.141-145), which revealed a new trend of developing stronger social and cultural links between the newcomers and the indigenous society.

When, after the 1990 reform, Amsterdam gained ten new administrative districts, the highest number of votes (resulting in 18 seats) in the local self-government elections was won by representatives of the Turkish diaspora, the then best integrating, politically active minority, involved in the area of art and culture. However, the following years were to bring a decrease in their involvement in the integration process, in comparison to the Moroccan diaspora, relatively corresponding to the Turkish one in terms of numbers and religion (Dagevos, 2001, pp. 13-16). Until then, it was assumed that the least integrating ethnic group were the Moroccans who in the previously mentioned municipal council elections in 1990 received only three votes. According to the report prepared 11 years later (2001) by Sociaal en year by Cultureel Planbureau (SCP) and commissioned by Raad voor het wetenschappelijk Regeringsbeleid (WRR), the place of the Moroccan minority was taken over by the Turkish minority inclined towards a deepening social isolation²⁵.

The current statistics are equally disturbing given the visible division on the autochthonous vs. allochthonous people, for example in the area of education, or employment, i.e. indicators used to assess the level of integration progress of ethnic minorities in the Netherlands.

3.1. EDUCATION

Education is one of the most important tools in the process of integration of immigrants in a new society. A good knowledge of the local language gives them a chance to develop, to acquire a better education and it

²³ The concept of “integration while preserving your own identity/culture” was typical of the 1970s and it did not bring the expected results. It was caused by the government which on the one hand advocated for the remigration of employees no longer necessary in the market, and on the other hand continued the policy aimed at the integration of newcomers. Such polarized operations towards minorities could only lead to disorganization and chaos.

²⁴ In the 1980s, a new strategy was introduced, i.e. Policy towards Ethnic Minorities, the primary aim of which was to prevent social exclusion of groups with different cultures and traditions.

²⁵ http://www.scp.nl/Publicaties/Alle_publicaties/Publicaties_2001 [10.11.2014].

translates directly into the social and economic position of the citizen. Achievements in the field of education promote equal opportunities for children from migrant backgrounds, prevent marginalization and tensions between immigrants and the rest of society, significantly increasing their employment opportunities, which in turn results in a higher income.

For the past 30 years, the Netherlands has been developing educational programs to support the development of the young generation of immigrants and to facilitate their integration in the Dutch society. This is guaranteed by one of the constitutional provisions (Paragraph 23 of the Constitution of the Netherlands)²⁶ which indicates education as a matter of particular concern for the state. In addition to acquiring knowledge and skills, immigrant children have the opportunity to learn the Dutch language and to have contact with the Dutch culture.

Dutch statistics, including the annual report issued by the Central Bureau of Statistics²⁷, however, point to the still unsatisfactory level of education among immigrants, particularly those of non-Western origin. Next to Moroccan immigrants, representatives of the Turkish minority account for a large proportion of the population with significant educational deficiencies compared to the indigenous people of the country.

This year's report commissioned by CBS (2014) clearly points out considerable delays and insufficient diligence on the part of non-Western diaspora, including the Turkish one, in the field of education. Compared to the Dutch society, the number of Turks without a degree still remains high: over 50% of members of this minority have only primary education (compared to only 9% of the Dutch). Almost 55% of Turks aged 20-24 have no professional qualifications²⁸. The data shows that despite an increase in education among Turkish immigrants, relatively they still lag behind when compared to the Dutch (Table 4). Education delays of immigrant children compared to Dutch children are explained by most experts and participants of the public debate with children's lack of knowledge of the Dutch language and a low social and economic status of their families. It is also worth noting that a significant number of parents have not mastered Dutch sufficiently, either.

One of the sins of omission was the belief originating as early as in the 1970s that immigrant children do not need extra lessons of Dutch, as this was perceived as an undue burden on the state budget. It was not until the late 1980s that the program "Dutch as a second language" was implemented into the education policy (Matusz - Protasiewicz, 2008, p.220), where it functions in a modified form until today²⁹. In 2001, the program was criticized for insufficient teaching staff with proper qualifications, among others by the then Minister of Education Van Kemenade, who originally supported the initiative³⁰.

Government oversights in the education policy, poorly prepared teaching staff and lack of awareness among immigrants of the need to learn Dutch have become one of the reasons why immigrants have remained closed in their own culture, partially leading to their decision to leave the Netherlands and to remigrate (Scheffer, 2010, p. 507).

Table 3. People enrolled in the first year of MA studies in 2012/2013 – selected ethnic groups by sex (in %).

	Indigenous	Turks	Moroccan	Other groups of non-Western immigrants
Total 2013/2014	63	48	40	62
Females	59	45	33	57
Males	67	52	48	69

Source: Based on *Jaarrapport Integratie 2014*, Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, The Hague/Heerlen, 2014, p. 47.

3.2. EMPLOYMENT

Analyzing the participation of the Turkish minority in the Dutch labour market, a few important elements must

²⁶ <http://libr.sejm.gov.pl/tek01/txt/konst/holandia.html> [21.11.2014].

²⁷ www.cbs.nl/com/statisticscbs [25.11.2014].

²⁸ Ibidem.

²⁹ <http://www.cbs.nl/nl-NL/menu/themas/dossiers/allochtonen/publicaties/artikelen/archief/2010/2010-3193-wm.htm?RefererType=RSSItem> [30.11.2014].

³⁰ TK (Tweede Kamer) 2003-2004, 28 689, No 8-9, p. 316.

be taken into account which have a substantial impact on statistics and reports for employment analyses of immigrants from Turkey. They include as follows: age, sex, traditional perceptions of the role of women, as well as social and cultural capital of the selected group. Also, structural and situational factors, such as the current economic crisis, government policy or experienced discrimination, may have a considerable effect on the evaluation of the employment situation among Turkish immigrants³¹.

Another significant aspect in this regard is historical awareness. The 1960s and 1970s are the years of the economic boom during which the Dutch labour market experienced an influx of mainly low-skilled labour force, among others from Turkey, who were underpaid and perceived as temporary workers. Thus, the starting position of the first Turkish immigrants compared to the current residents of Turkish origin differs significantly; nevertheless, it still affects their jobs and professional functions (Zorlu, Hartog, 2008, pp. 113-151). Today, the second and third generation of Turks is much better educated and covers a much wider range of career paths than the older generation. However, due to the continuously high percentage of unemployed people within this part of the diaspora, we cannot speak of a spectacular victory of the young generation (Table 4). To quote Vermeulen and Penninx, time and “democratic impatience” are needed for the social and economic inequalities, which still prevail between the indigenous and allochthonous people, to subside (Vermeulen, Penninx, 1994, p. 258).

Table 4. The unemployed in the Netherlands, with focus on the Turkish minority, in 2013 (in %).

	Turks	Other non-Western immigrants	Non-Western immigrants (total)	Indigenous
Total	15	15	16	5
Males	12	15	15	5
Females	18	15	16	5
Aged 15-24	26	25	28	10
Aged 25-44	12	15	15	4
Aged 45-64	15	11	11	5
First generation	12	15	15	-
Second generation	18	13	18	-

Source: Based on *Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau, Jaarrapport integratie 2013, Participatie van migranten op de arbeidsmarkt*, The Hague, 2014.

Periodic positive changes are also observed in the Dutch labour market with respect to the Turkish diaspora participating in it. Indeed, compared to 2001, the employment rate among the Turkish Dutch significantly improved in 2012. Over a decade ago, it amounted to 49.4% per annum, while in 2012 it increased to 54.2%. The rise was observed mainly in 2004-2008 (Staring, Geelhoed, Aslanoğlu, Hiah, Kox, 2014, p. 75). Nevertheless, the position of representatives of the Turkish diaspora in the Dutch labour market is still far from satisfactory, mainly due to adverse conditions of their employment contracts. Consequently, quite a high percentage of them opt for self-employment (Huijnk, Gijsberts, Dagevos, 2013, pp. 190-192). Moreover, the economic recession of the recent years resulted in a critical drop in the employment rate among Turkish immigrants observed since 2014. Compared to 2001, it has fallen four times (op. cit. p. 35).

Another disturbing phenomenon related to the Dutch labour market is the discrimination of immigrants, particularly those of Muslim origin. A significant number of representatives of the Turkish diaspora have experienced injustice and worse treatment from their employers and co-workers, or possible employers hiring them for example for professional internships (op. cit., pp. 3-4).

The most recent statistics show a deepening trend of the last few years bringing substantial differences in the labour market participation of non-Western minorities compared to indigenous people and new immigrants from the EU. Turks do not provide for a satisfactory reference point in this respect (Table 3).

³¹ <https://www.wodc.nl/onderzoeksdatabase/integratie-en-radicalisme-onder-turkse-nederlanders-en-turkse-duitsers.aspx> [11.10.2014].

Table 4. Net participation in the labour market – by sex, age and generation in 2013 (in %).

	Indigenous	Western immigrants	New immigrants from the EU	Non-Western immigrants	Turks
Total	69	64	65	50	47
Males	75	71	77	65	58
Females	63	57	57	44	35
Aged 15-24	38	32	32	24	23
Aged 25-44	84	75	76	60	59
Aged 45-64	69	64	62	54	45
First generation	-	61	66	52	51
Second generation	-	66	64	46	41

Source: Based on *Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau, Jaarrapport integratie 2013, Participatie van migranten op de arbeidsmarkt*, The Hague, 2014.

4. CONCLUSIONS

The Netherlands is an example of one of many European countries which are an attractive destination for immigrants. Not all of them are refugees, as a large proportion of immigrants simply seek a better life. Often in response to the invitation of the European countries themselves, they supply their labour markets. For decades, Western governments have responded to the needs of their rapidly developing economies by opening their borders to foreign workers. Economic calculations, however, did not include social and cultural consequences of mass migrations. For a long time it was believed that one day immigrants will return to their countries and with them gone all the problems will disappear.

A number of issues have been highlighted here which are faced every day by representatives of the Turkish diaspora, particularly its youngest generation. Discrimination and exclusion, particularly in the labour market, often result in emotional instability, diseases and apathy among immigrants, and in extreme cases even in the decision to leave the Netherlands.

Problems faced by immigrants affect society as a whole. The basic principle of integration is reciprocity based on equal treatment. The first article of the Dutch constitution reads as follows: "All persons in the Netherlands shall be treated equally in equal circumstances. Discrimination on the grounds of religion, belief, political opinion, race or sex or on any other grounds whatsoever shall not be permitted"³². It turns out, however, that it is not an easy task to turn equality into a form of co-existence that would be binding for everyone.

The fact that European societies have not proven to be very successful as countries of integration results among others from underestimating the changes that come with migrations on a global scale. Globalization is by no means a manifestation of backwardness; just on the contrary, it is a step towards modernity. The problem arises when the idea of pluralism is beginning to be misinterpreted. It turns into a caricature of this significant achievement of democracy, and as such can lead to a permanent misunderstanding and may hinder a constructive discussion in a culturally diverse society.

It seems that multicultural societies in Europe have come to a moment in which it is necessary to implement certain changes in thinking about integration, with a greater focus on the idea of full civic participation and civic co-responsibility, in accordance with the principle of "shared citizenship" including representatives of different cultures.

4. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This research was financially supported by the Ministry of Science and Higher Education Republic of Poland (Grant NO. 614 501).

³² Article 1 of the Constitution of the Netherlands of 28 March 1814, uniform text of 21 March 2002. <http://www.government.nl/documents-and-publications/regulations/2012/10/18/the-constitution-of-the-kingdom-of-the-netherlands-2008.html> [19.11.2014].

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TABLES

Table 2. Major diasporas of non-Western immigrants in the Netherlands (2012-2014).

Table 2. Dutch Turks emigrating from the Netherlands in 2004-2011, by age group (x 1000).

Table 3. People enrolled in the first year of MA studies in 2012/2013 – selected ethnic groups by sex (in %).

Table 4. Net participation in the labour market – by sex, age and generation in 2013 (in %).